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THE BILLABLE HOURS DERBY:
EMPIRICAL DATA ON THE PROBLEMS
AND PRESSURE POINTS
Susan Saab Fortney*
If you ask law firm attorneys to identify their biggest complaint
related to private law practice, most will probably respond with
one word: billing. At the same time, clients are likely to identify
billing as their most serious concern associated with obtaining legal
services.2 The irony in clients and attorneys sharing frustration
over hourly billing relates to the fact that the initial interest in
hourly billing stemmed from attorneys' desire to be efficient and to
maximize their earnings and clients' preference for only paying for
the actual time expended on their behalf.3 Since the 1960s, hourly
* I thank Professor Bruce Green, Professor Russell Pearce, and the members of
the FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL for the opportunity to participate in this worth-
while symposium on professional challenges facing large law firms. I also appreciate
the support of the NALP foundation and the assistance of its president, Paula Patton.
Finally, I recognize the contributions of the many lawyers who participated in the
NALP Foundation Work-Life Study.
1. As explained by President of the American Bar Association, Robert E. Hir-
shon, in his Preface to the A.B.A Commission on Billable Hours Report, "It has be-
come increasingly clear that many of the legal profession's contemporary woes
intersect at the billable hour." A.B.A. COMMISSION ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT
2001-2002, available at http://www.abanet.org/careercounsel/billable.toolkit/bhcom-
plete.pdf at ix [hereinafter A.B.A. BILLABLE HOURS COMMISSION REPORT].
2. A recent American Bar Association Section of Litigation study on public per-
ceptions of attorneys found attorneys fees to be at the heart of many consumers,
negative experiences with attorneys. According to the study report: "Of all the criti-
cism that consumers raise about their personal experiences with lawyers, the greatest
number of complaints arise around lawyers' fees. Consumers say that lawyers charge
too much for their services, are often not up front about their fees, and are unwilling
to account for their charges or hours." Leo J. Shapiro & Associates, Public Percep-
tions of Lawyers-Consumer Research Findings, 2002 A.B.A SEC. LITIG. 14, available
at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/lawyers/publicperceptions.pdf.
3. In the 1960s, management consultants suggested that attorneys who used
hourly billing to determine their fees made more than those who used other methods.
Stephen W. Jones & Melissa Bear Glover, The Attack on Traditional Billing Practices,
20 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L. REV. 293, 294 (1998). At the same time, corporate man-
agers and members of the business community reportedly welcomed hourly billing
because it enabled clients to "correlate the 'product' that they are buying to the prod-
ucts they themselves produced and sold." William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly
Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 11 n.64 (1991) (citing Mary Ann Altman,
A Perspective-From Value Billing to Time Billing and Back to Value Billing, in BE-
YOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS
11 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989)).
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billing has evolved as the dominant billing method used by non-
contingency fee attorneys.4 When hourly billing became wide-
spread, the number of billable hours expected of firm attorneys
dramatically increased as billable hours clocked and business gen-
erated assumed greater importance in evaluating attorney contri-
butions and compensation.5 As explained by one commentator,
"[h]ourly billing, which started as a tool for law office manage-
ment, turned into a requirement for all timekeepers to bill a large
minimum number of hours per year. Salary, bonus and growth
within the firm began to be largely based on the number of hours
billed."6
Over the last decade the number of hours expected of associates
increased along with hikes in associate salaries.7 Pointing to the
spiral of increases in associate salaries followed by increases in bill-
able hours requirements, firm managers may engage in an exercise
of blaming the "greedy associates." Another reaction involves
blaming the "greedy partners" who seek to preserve or even in-
crease partner revenues, while using higher salaries to recruit
associates.
Insiders and outsiders alike have speculated on the short and
long-term effects of these increases in billable hours expectations.8
To gauge the effects of these increases, I conducted a 1999-2000
empirical study of associate satisfaction, law firm culture, and bill-
ing practices. This study used a mail questionnaire to survey 1000
4. See Robert E. Hirshon, Law and the Billable Hour, A Standard Developed in
the 1960s May Be Damaging Our Profession, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2002, at 10 (noting that
hourly billing became the norm in the 1960s with the elimination of bar fee-schedules
and a cost-conscious revolt against the one-line fee letters). While clients "enjoy the
detail [of hourly billing], firms enjoy the limited risk and the ease of valuing associates
and partners." Id.
5. For the history of hourly billing that traces the shift from "billable hours goals"
to "billable hour commitments," see A.B.A. COMMISSION ON BILLABLE HOURS RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 3 (observing that "billable hour commitments reached unrea-
sonably high levels in many firms" during the 1990s).
6. Gerald F. Phillips, The Rules of Professional Conduct Should Provide Gui-
dance to Attorneys with Respect to Billing Clients, PROF. LAW., Spring 2004, at 2.
7. For a discussion of the connection between increases in associate salaries and
billable hour requirements, see Susan Saab Fortney, I Don't Have Time To Be Ethical:
Addressing the Effects of Billable Hour Pressure, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 305, 305-06 (2003)
(referring to one analysis that estimated that associates would be working an extra
300 hours a year to fund some salary increases).
8. See, e.g., A.B.A. BILLABLE HOURS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-11
(reviewing the "unintended consequences" and "corrosive impact of emphasis on bill-
able hours"); WILLIAM G. Ross, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF THE TIME-
BASED BILLING By ATTORNEY (1996) (analyzing the results of two surveys on billa-
ble hours practices).
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associates practicing in Texas firms with more than ten attorneys.9
Five years later, in 2005, I conducted another empirical study on
attorney work-life issues and employer efforts to assist attorneys in
dealing with work-life conflicts. The 2005 study, funded by The
NALP Foundation, was a cross-profession national study of super-
vised and managing attorneys in law firms, government offices, and
in-house counsel departments. Although the NALP Foundation
study, called In Pursuit of Attorney Work-Life Balance: Best Prac-
tices in Management ("2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life Study"),
focused on work-life issues, billable hours pressure emerged as a
concern shared by numerous firm attorneys. 10 In discussing the
time famine and other work-life conflicts encountered by practi-
tioners, numerous study participants commented on the tyranny of
the billable hour.1"
In an effort to formulate possible solutions to problems identi-
fied by practitioners, this article uses information obtained in both
studies to discuss firm culture, compensation systems, attorney per-
ceptions, and conduct. For background and context, Part I de-
scribes the 2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life Study rationale and
methodology. Part II summarizes select study findings related to
billable hours requirements and pressure. The text of this article
discusses select findings from the 2005 NALP Foundation Work-
Life Study relating to billable hours requirements; the footnotes
compare those findings to the results of the 1999-2000 Associate
Study. Part III concludes by considering what forces and players
will change the current course of conduct in which law firm leaders
treat increases in billable hours expectations as a necessary evil.
PART I: STUDY RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY
In 2005, The NALP Foundation conducted a national study of
attorneys' work-life balance issues to help attorneys and their em-
ployers better understand and evaluate work-life conflicts and ap-
proaches for addressing conflicts. Unlike other studies that
focused on attorneys in one state or practice setting, the study
9. For a discussion of the study methodology, results, and recommendations, see
Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law
Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239,
243-99 (2000) [hereinafter 1999-2000 Associate Survey].
10. For the complete study report, see SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY, IN PURSUIT OF
ATTORNEY WORK-LIFE BALANCE: BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGEMENT (Paula Patton
ed., 2005) [hereinafter 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY].
11. See infra Part II.
2005]
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sought information from a national sample of managing and super-
vised attorneys in different practice settings.
The national study involved two phases, one designed to yield
quantitative information and one designed to provide qualitative
information. In Phase One of the study, survey information was
obtained using two questionnaires, one for managing attorneys
("Managing Attorney Work-Life Survey") and one for supervised
attorneys ("Attorney Work-Life Survey"). In February 2005, these
questionnaires were mailed to a random sample of attorneys in law
firms, corporations, and government agencies. 12
The study design called for 250 questionnaires to be sent to man-
aging attorneys in each of the following groups: government of-
fices, corporate legal departments, and law firms of varying sizes.13
In addition, four supervised attorneys in each of these segments
were randomly selected to receive the Attorney Work-Life Survey.
After sampling and dropping names for reasons such as address
problems, the final sample consisted of 1,138 managing attorneys
and 4,649 supervised attorneys in all segments."
The mailing of the Attorney Work-Life Survey and Managing
Attorney Work-Life Survey yielded 679 responses for a response
rate of 12.3 percent for supervised attorneys and 9.4 percent for
managing attorneys. The responses from managing and supervised
attorneys were spread among each practice segment.15
After survey responses were received, nine focus group sessions
were conducted to provide a mix of perspectives from attorneys in
different practice areas, positions, and regions. 16 In these focus
groups, managing and supervised attorneys candidly and confiden-
tially discussed work-life issues. 17 The focus group discussions pro-
vided opportunities to explore specific issues identified in Phase
12. For information on the number of respondents in each category, see 2005
NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, at app. A, 84-85.
13. The law firm study population targeted attorneys in Large Firms, defined as
firms with more than 150 attorneys in all offices, Mid-Sized Firms defined as firms
with 50 to 150 attorneys in all offices, and Small Firms, defined to be firms with 10 to
49 attorneys in all offices. Id. at 84.
14. See id. at 83-86 (providing additional information on the survey methodology).
15. Id. at 84-85 (providing detailed information on the response rates of each prac-
tice sector).
16. Id. at 85-86. A focus group coordinator used a variety of means to invite attor-
neys to participate in focus groups in their area, including email invitations sent by
law schools and bar associations, as well as individual invitations sent to a random
sample of attorneys in the select cities). Id.
17. Id. at 86. Focus groups met in Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York
City, and Washington, D.C. Firm associates and partners met in separate focus
groups. Id.
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One of the study.18 Focus group participants also provided insights
and anecdotal information related to their experiences and per-
spectives on work-life issues, employer programs, employer poli-
cies, and best practices related to attorneys balancing their work
and personal lives. 19
PART II: GENERAL PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS AND SURVEY
FINDINGS RELATED TO BILLING AND BILLABLE
HOURS EXPECTATIONS
The survey generated responses from managing and employed
attorneys working in government offices, in-house legal depart-
ments, and firms with ten or more attorneys in all branches or of-
fices worldwide. The discussion below focuses on information
provided by law firm respondents.
The majority of firm respondents (81.9 percent) were associates
on the partnership track, eight percent were law firm attorneys not
on the partnership track, and 0.5 percent were contract attorneys.
Most of these respondents (93.2 percent) worked on a full-time ba-
sis and 6.8 percent worked on a part-time basis.2 °
Both survey instruments asked respondents to provide informa-
tion related to hours billed and billable hours expectations, if any.
Survey data reflects the trend among law firms to adopt minimum
billing expectations or requirements.21 When asked to indicate
whether the respondent's organization has a minimum billable
hours expectation or requirement for associates, 82.8 percent of
firm managing attorneys checked "yes" and 85.6 percent of firm
supervised attorneys checked "yes." The questionnaires then
asked respondents to note the annual billing expectation or re-
quirement. The mean number of hours for the billable hours re-
18. Id. at 86. An experienced focus group facilitator used a query script to guide
the discussion. The query script covered the following areas: (1) work-life conflicts
and work demands; (2) organizational policies, practices and work-life strategies; (3)
organizational culture and attitudes related to work-life issues; and (4) professional
expectations and attorney retention. Id.
19. See 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 85-115
(providing additional information on the focus groups).
20. Id. at 9. Among all respondents from the three practice sectors, 5.9 percent
indicated that they worked part-time. Id.
21. See Molly George, Do You Get What You Pay For? Measure Your Associates'
ROI, LEGAL MGMT., May-June 2003, at 58, 62 (noting that most firms require be-
tween 1,700 and 2,300 billable hours from their associates). Across the Atlantic, "col-
legial" British firms have joined the movement to set and increase billable hours
targets. Gail Diane Cox, A Hop Across the Pond Fills New York Firms' Pockets, THE
RECORDER, Sept. 11, 2003, at 2.
2005]
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quirement or expectation was 1,861 hours per year based on
managing attorney responses and 1,887 hours per year based on
supervised attorney responses.
Table One below sets forth the mean calculations by firm size
based on supervised attorney responses on billable hours require-
ments and hours actually billed.
TABLE ONE
22
FIRM SIZE AND ANNUAL MINIMUM BILLING REQUIREMENT AND
HOURS BILLED IN 2004 AS REPORTED BY SUPERVISED
FIRM ATTORNEYS
Mean Hours Mean Hours
Firm Size Required Billed in 2004
Small Firms (10-49 attorneys) 1867 1886
Mid-size Firms (50-150 attorneys) 1895 1953
Large Firms (151-300 attorneys) 1919 1971
Very Large Firms (over 300 attorneys) 1930 2059
The mean calculations in Table One reflect that the mean for
hours required, as well as hours actually billed in 2004, increased
with firm size. In firms of all sizes, the mean number for hours
billed exceeds the minimum billable expectation, anywhere from
nineteen hours for Small Firms to 129 hours for Very Large Firms.
Associates whose billable hours production exceeds the minimum
requirement may expect favorable treatment when considered for
bonuses and promotion. 3
Survey responses also reflect the movement among firms to use
billable hours production to determine bonuses.24 In the survey,
the majority of managers and supervising attorneys reported that
associate bonuses are largely based on billable hours production.
While eighty-three percent of supervised attorneys indicated that
22. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 10.
23. These associates may understand that, "most law firms tie associate perform-
ance assessments to billable hours ... " Billable Hours: An On-Going Threat to Asso-
ciate Retention, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS FOR L. OFF., Sept. 2002, at 11.
24. See AMLAW 100 Revenues Climb, But not Profits, N.Y.L. J., July 2, 2001, at 1
(referring to the trend to link bonuses to billable hours). Questioning the wisdom of
hours-driven incentives, one large Texas firm has recently moved from an "hours-
driven bonus system" to a discretionary one. Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Thompson &
Knight Raises Associates' Base Salaries, TEX. LAW. Aug. 9, 2004, at 1. In explaining
the shift in approach, the managing partner of Thompson & Knight explained, "We
had an hours-driven bonus system, and we decided that was not the best system for
associate development, or for client service ... If it's hours driven, people do what
you measure." Id.
[Vol. XXXIII
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bonuses were largely based on billable hours production, only 67.2
percent of firm managing attorneys answered in the affirmative.
This difference in percentages could reflect the fact that different
law firms may be represented by the respondents in the two
surveys. Another possibility is that a large percentage of associates
may perceive billable hours production as "driving the bonus
train," although managing attorneys may not share that perception.
A third possibility is that some managing attorneys either genu-
inely believe that they base bonuses on a variety of factors or de-
cline to acknowledge the significant role that hours play in bonus
determinations.25
Other survey responses provide supervised attorneys' perspec-
tives on the firm incentives to clock hours. The majority of firm
supervised attorneys (fifty-two percent) agreed with the following
statement, "My career advancement is principally based on the
number of hours that I work. '26 Only twenty-two percent dis-
agreed with the statement.27
Overall, a commonly expressed complaint related to "quanti-
fying" worth and contributions based on billable hours production.
One supervised firm attorney simply stated that "devotion equals
promotion. The more you work the higher you rise."'28 Other re-
spondents commented on other consequences of emphasizing billa-
ble hours production.29 One consequence that should concern
25. Rather than using an hours-driven bonus system, some firms rely primarily on
salary adjustments to recognize total contributions made by attorneys. For example,
Schmeltzer, Aptaker & Shepard, P.C., a mid-size litigation boutique, evaluates part-
ners and associates "holistically," considering a number of factors, as opposed to set-
ting compensation solely on hours. A.B.A. BILLABLE HOURS COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1, at 54-55.
26. Out of the fifty-two percent of respondents who indicated that they agree with
this statement, nineteen percent indicated that they "strongly agree." In the 1999-
2000 Associate Study, thirty-two percent of respondents noted that they "strongly
agree" with the statement, "My income and advancement within the firm are princi-
pally based on the number of hours that I bill and collect." Another forty-four per-
cent indicated that they "somewhat agree" with the statement. 1999-2000 Associate
Study supra note 9, at 277.
27. Approximately four percent of the twenty-two percent of respondents indi-
cated that they "strongly disagree" with the statement, "My career advancement is
principally based on the hours that I work." 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE
SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at 97.
28. Id. at 19.
29. One respondent referred to this as an "obsession with the numbers." Unpub-
lished data from the 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA]. In criticizing reliance
on "the numbers," one commentary warns that "using the number of hours to bill
clients and assess productivity reduced attorneys' work to something on par with a
quota system" condemned in other settings. Robert Pack, The Tyranny of the Billable
FORDHAM URB. L.J.
firms as providers of legal services and clients is that rewarding
high billable hours production "breeds overwork." As explained
by a supervised firm attorney, an "efficient and productive associ-
ate" is "penalized," while the associate who may "pad" hours "gets
a significant raise/bonus. '"30 Another survey respondent described
the competitive disadvantage for ethical associates as follows:
The 2000 billable hour requirement is an impossible task for an
HONEST hardworking attorney. I am here every day at least
12 hours and NEVER take a lunch. But not everything is billa-
ble. I made my hours last year but did so only because I did not
take a vacation. I HATE being an attorney! I have no life. I
know that my colleagues regularly falsely elevate their time en-
tries. They have to because they all take lunches everyday and
leave at 5 or 6 every night.31
This quotation captures the dilemma for ethical attorneys. If a
firm largely bases compensation on hourly production, ethical asso-
ciates who refuse to pad time may function at a competitive disad-
vantage when compared to associates who inflate their time.
Based on study findings from my 1999-2000 empirical study on bill-
able hours expectations and firm culture, I opined that a serious
deleterious effect of "quantifying" value may be the exodus of ethi-
cal associates who leave, private law practice rather than rational-
izing questionable billing practices.32
Focus group participants provided additional insights on the con-
nection between billing hours and firm culture, compensation, and
attorney conduct. Firm associates and partners alike discussed in-
creased pressure to bill. For example, in response to an inquiry on
perceived changes in the legal profession, one New York partner
noted that the demand for hours is "substantially higher. '33
Hour, WASH. LAW., Jan. 2005, at 20. Personnel claims may be an unintended conse-
quence of "quantifying" contributions. See 1999-2000 Associate Survey, supra note 9,
at 275-78 (discussing the risks of emphasizing quantity over quality).
30. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
31. Id.
32. The 1999-2000 Associate Survey asked respondents to indicate whether they
agreed with the following statement: "Billing pressure causes ethical and competent
attorneys to leave private law practice." Forty-six percent agreed with the statement,
while twenty-three percent disagreed. The balance neither agreed nor disagreed.
1999-2000 Associate Survey, supra note 9, at 279 (concluding that findings related to
the "exodus of ethical associates" may be "the most disturbing survey result because
it suggests that billing pressure may be causing firms to lose ethical associates and
future leaders who uphold high ethical standards").
33. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29. Another partner
participant in the New York focus group concurred, stating, "Hours that are required
[Vol. XXXIII
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Partners participating in focus groups recognized the connection
between increases in billing expectations and salary hikes. One
Chicago partner questioned the trend of "mandating advancement
in salary levels based upon mandated billable hours for the year."34
The partner explained that this trend resulted first in a "real bump
in associate-starting salaries" and then an increase in the "level of
billable hours ... not only for associates, but for partners."35
Commenting on increases in salary and billable hours require-
ments, an associate participating in the New York focus group
explained:
The hours keep going up and it doesn't seem like there is a limit
or ceiling on how high a firm thinks it can put those billable
hours.... As the hours keep going up [there] is less recognition
that you have a life outside of work and more recognition that
you are supposed to be here billing......
Respondents frequently commented on employer emphasis on
billable hours production and the pressure to clock long hours. In
struggling to meet billing expectations or targets, respondents ex-
plained the additional time commitment associated with complet-
ing non-billable tasks such as recruiting, training, speaking, writing,
and marketing. Some noted that this non-billable work does not
receive credit or consideration for bonus purposes. 7
For many, billable hours pressure and long hours were at the
heart of work-life conflicts. From the standpoint of individual at-
torneys, the "obsession with the numbers" may make it difficult for
people to be successful and have a balanced life. According to one
respondent, "Obviously, my major life struggle comes from billable
now are much greater than 10, 12 years ago, and I don't see any let up in sight going
forward, either for partners or associates." Id.
34. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
35. Id. In speaking of the practice of "mandating advancement in salary levels
based upon a mandated billable hours for the year," the Chicago partner stated, "I
think the profession would be better served and I think clients would be better served
if that ... became an unethical practice." Id.
36. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 67. The as-
sociate reported a willingness to take "$25,000 less if you gave me back those fifty
hours." UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
37. In recognition of the fact that attorneys must devote time to activities such as
continuing legal education, business promotion, and administrative work, the old rule
of thumb was that one-third of an attorney's work time is non-billable. William G.
Ross, Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2199, 2203 (1998)
(explaining that experts agree that approximately one-third of office time is "typically
consumed by non-billable activities"). Apparently, this message has not been con-
veyed to associates who maintain that non-billable time should "count" toward billa-
ble requirements. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
2005] 179
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hours. I NEVER stay at work late because there's work to be
done. I ONLY stay late, and deprive my family for a billable
hour."38
A few managing attorneys commented on the personal toll taken
when firms increase billable hour expectations. One firm manager
noted that it was "ludicrous" that large firms that require over 2000
hours as a minimum "are also interested in quality of life issues.""
The manager went on to say, "There is NOTHING more damaging
to work-life issues than unrealistic billable hours. You don't need
concierge services and other perks like that if your people have
enough of a balance in their lives."40
In response to the open-ended inquiry that asked supervised at-
torneys to describe improvements their employers could make to
ameliorate work-life conflicts, some respondents recommended
eliminating billable minimums.4 Many more urged lowering the
billable hours requirement or target.42 One respondent criticized a
2000 per year minimum, stating: "It is ridiculous that [2000 hours]
is considered a 'minimum.' With a minimum that high I have no
need to know what a maximum or above average expectation looks
like. 43
Beyond the work-life conflicts created by increased billable
hours pressure, focus group participants, like survey respondents,
expressed concern about inefficiency and unnecessary work per-
formed when compensation structures create incentives to bill. 4
38. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 19.
39. Id. at 29.
40. Id.
41. As stated by one supervised attorney who completed the Attorney Work-Life
Survey:
Get rid of the billable minimum! It makes law firm work too stressful; it
encourages bill padding, it discourages training. Law firm culture already
insures we won't say "no" to assignments, so we don't need the 1950 threat
looming over us to make us work and because our compensation is tied to
meeting the 1950 threshold, its unfair to penalize associates who don't meet
that requirement in years when there wasn't enough work available. It's a
bad system.
UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
42. Id. For example, one respondent recommended reducing "minimum billable
hours to a realistic goal, say 1,700-1,800." Id.
43. Id.
44. The focus group respondents shared concerns similar to those expressed by
various commentators who question rewarding hours production. See 1999-2000 As-
sociate Survey, supra note 9, at 275-78. As suggested by Professor David B. Wilkins
and G. Mitu Gulati, using hours to measure associates' work creates an incentive for
associates to inflate their hours. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the
[Vol. XXXIII
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Speaking of high billable hours expectations, one Chicago partner
cautioned:
There has to be a temptation-and then it gets realized-of bill-
ing hours that are, indeed, not necessary or not efficient because
of the target of maintaining those billable hours is more impor-
tant and is a bigger incentive than billing those hours, spending
that time because you want to make sure that the clients' inter-
ests were served.45
Later in the focus group, the same Chicago partner explained
that the partner's firm addressed the risk of inefficiency and over-
working client matters by requiring billing attorneys to "scrutinize
very heavily the hours. ' 46 Such scrutiny may help allay client con-
cerns about the impact of firm practices of increasing billing re-
quirements and calculating bonuses based on hours billed.47  In
addition, clients or their representatives may audit bills, looking for
inefficiency and padding.48
While supervising attorneys, clients, and their representatives
may be able to detect unnecessary billing entries, compromised
performance may be more difficult to detect. To obtain informa-
tion related to work demands and cognitive performance, the At-
torney Work-Life Survey included two inquiries related to
cognitive performance. The first question asked respondents to in-
Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal
Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1594 (1998).
45. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 20.
46. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29. As explained in a
commentary on billing practices, "partners should review bills with new associates
each month, so they can see how the law firm billed for their work." Stephanie Fran-
cis Ward, Billing Basics, Associates Need to Learn Nuances of Billing Before Starting
Big Projects, 90 A.B.A. J. 42, 42, Oct. 2004 (quoting a fifth-year associate who sug-
gests that such review does not occur because "everyone is so busy").
47. Unfortunately, anecdotal and study reports suggest that large percentages of
supervising attorneys may not be closely monitoring billing entries. In the 1999-2000
Associate Survey, sixty-one percent of firm associates reported that their supervising
attorneys never questioned their billing entries during the past year. 1999-2000 Asso-
ciate Survey, supra note 9, at 256. Over seventy percent of associates in firms with
over 100 attorneys indicated that their billings had never been questioned in the past
year. Id. Supervising attorneys may be less inclined to devote time to scrutinizing
billings, training, and mentoring if the partner compensation turns on objective mea-
sures, such as hours billed and business generated. See id. at 281-83 (discussing com-
mentary and study findings related to the affect of partner compensation systems on
partner willingness to serve as supervisors and mentors).
48. See Nat Slavin, The Never-Ending Quest for Legal Alternatives, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 2004, at 4 (explaining that the 1990s movement to hire independent com-
panies to audit bills was followed by a move to use software and Internet tools to
examine fees charged by outside counsel).
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dicate the average amount of sleep they obtain. Among law firm
respondents, three percent reported that they average less than
five hours of sleep per night before a work day and 35.7 percent
reported that they average five to six hours of sleep per night.49
These attorneys may not be obtaining adequate sleep for peak per-
formance because sleep research has revealed that individuals con-
sistently sleeping six or fewer hours per night may be accumulating
a "sleep debt" that "cuts into their cognitive abilities. 50
Another survey inquiry asked respondents to register their opin-
ions on work demands insidiously undermining attorneys' ability to
provide top quality legal services. The questionnaire asked super-
vised attorneys whether they agreed or disagreed with the follow-
ing statement: "Working long hours adversely affects my ability to
think critically and creatively. ' '51 The majority of firm respondents
(62.8 percent) agreed with the statement. Only 19.2 percent of re-
spondents disagreed with the statement.52
49. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at 94.
50. "Sleep Debts" Accrue When Nightly Sleep Totals Six Hours or Fewer, Penn
Study Find People Respond Poorly, While Feeling Only "Slightly" Tired, Sci. DAILY,
Mar. 14, 2003, available at http://www.sciencedaily.comlreleases/2003/03/
030314071202.htm (referring to research with sleep-deprived individuals). According
to Dr. Hans P.A. Van Dongen, author of the sleep study, "[R]outine nightly sleep for
fewer than six hours results in cognitive performance deficits, even if we feel we have
adapted to it." Id.
51. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at 97.
52. Id. at 27. The following breaks down the respondents' opinions on the critical
thinking statement: 18.4 percent strongly agreed, 44.4 percent agreed, 17.9 percent
neither agreed nor disagreed, 16.5 percent disagreed, and 2.7 percent strongly dis-
agreed. In the 1999-2000 Associate Survey, twenty-two percent of respondents
strongly agreed with the statement, "Working long hours adversely affects my ability
to think critically and creatively." Another forty-two percent "somewhat agreed"
with the statement. Only nineteen percent disagreed with the statement. 1999-2000
Associate Survey, supra note 9, at 274 n. 219 (discussing survey results and commen-
tary related to the adverse effect on quality when attorneys consistently work long
hours).
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TABLE Two 53
AGREEMENT WITH STATEMENTS ON STRESS AND WORK-LIFE
BALANCE AS REPORTED BY FIRM SUPERVISED ATTORNEYS
Strongly Neither Strongly
Statement Disagree Disagree Agree/Disagree Agree Agree
I feel stressed and
fatigued most of the time 3% 22% 22.5% 37.9% 14.6%
I must sacrifice
fulfillment outside of
work in order to advance
in my career 4.1% 16.5% 16.5% 44.7% 18.2%
I have a good balance
between my job and
personal life 7% 35.9% 20.3% 31.9% 4.9%
Other survey inquiries provided insights related to the personal
and professional toll taken when attorneys work long hours with
little or no balance between their personal and professional lives.
Table Two sets forth the respondents' level of agreement with
statements related to stress and work-life balance.
As indicated in Table Two, the majority of law firm respondents
indicated that they feel stressed and fatigued most of the time. In
addition, the majority of these respondents believe that they must
sacrifice fulfillment outside of work in order to advance in their
careers. By comparison, smaller percentages of corporate and gov-
ernment respondents agreed with these statements. Among the
three practice sectors, law firm respondents reported the lowest
percentage of agreement with the statement, "I have a good bal-
ance between my job and personal life."'5 4 Long hours, stress, and
work-life conflicts may contribute to job dissatisfaction and the de-
sire to change employers. Survey results outlined in Table Three
reveal a relationship between the responses on the work-life bal-
ance inquiries and respondents' desire to change jobs in the next
two years.
TABLE THREE
55
COMPARISON BETWEEN AGREEMENT QUESTIONS AND DESIRE
TO CHANGE JOBS
Positions on the Statements Reported as Means*
53. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 27.
54. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, app. B at 97.
55. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE SURVEY, supra note 10, at 32.
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I have a good balance between my job and my personal life.
All Government Corporate Firm
Yes, I want to change employers in the
next two years 2.60 3.15 2.50 2.49
No, I do not want to change
employers in the next two years 3.48 3.63 3.41 3.43
Not sure if I want to change
employers in the next two years 3.07 3.79 3.36 2.85
I must sacrifice fulfillment outside of work in order to advance in my career.
Yes, I want to change employers in the
next two years 3.81 3.27 3.79 3.93
No, I do not want to change
employers in the next two years 2.87 2.34 2.93 3.07
Not sure if I want to change
employers in the next two years 3.52 2.89 3.25 3.70
* Higher numbers reflect greater agreement with the statement because means were calculated
using the following scale:
1=Strongly Disagree 2=Disagree 3=Neither Agree/Disagree 4=Agree 5=Strongly Agree
Based on the mean calculations set forth in Table Three, respon-
dents not interested in changing jobs reported more agreement
with the statement, "I have a good balance between my job and my
personal life," than respondents interested in changing jobs. At
the same time, the mean calculation for supervised attorneys inter-
ested in changing jobs showed more agreement with the statement,
"I have to sacrifice fulfillment outside of work in order to advance
in my career," as compared to the mean for attorneys not inter-
ested in changing jobs. These results are consistent with the com-
monly held belief that billable hours pressure and long work hours
play a prominent role in driving attorneys to the exit door.
"Numerous studies show that attorneys flee law firms because
they believe that firms' high billable hours requirements prevent
"956them from balancing their work and their personal lives ....
Findings from the 2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life Study add to
the body of empirical research indicating that working long hours
adversely affects morale, job satisfaction, and retention. 7 In the
2005 study, thirty-seven percent of firm respondents reported that
they were interested in changing jobs in the next few years.58
When asked to identify the factor that was most influential in caus-
56. Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Part-Time Progress, Letting Law-
yers Cut Back Can Save Money and Retain Talent-If Firms Do It Right, LEGAL
TIMEs, Oct. 22, 2001, at 60 (noting that replacing a second or third-year associate costs
between $200,000 and $500,000).
57. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, 28-33.
58. Id., app. B at 95.
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ing them to change jobs, the largest percentage of firm attorneys
(26.4 percent) checked "reduction of work hours. ' 59 The largest
percentage of firm respondents who want to change jobs indicated
that they were most interested in a corporate counsel job. Evi-
dently, these attorneys are not leaving the field of law, but are in-
terested in escaping billable hours practice.6 °
PART III: "BoTrOM-UP" AND MARKET PRESSURE TO ADDRESS
THE DAMAGING EFFECTS OF INCREASED BILLABLE
HOURS EXPECTATIONS
While practitioners may bemoan the emphasis on billable hours
production and other objective measures of success in law firms,
they often express pessimism about the possibility of changes to
address work-life conflicts.61 In the 2005 NALP Foundation Work-
Life study, various respondents criticized current approaches used
in firms, while suggesting that lawyers are locked into the current
system. For example, in response to the open-ended question that
asked respondents to describe improvements to "ameliorate work-
life conflicts," one respondent stated, "have everyone work less
and earn less = fantasy."62 Another respondent suggested that
firms "eliminate billable hours, which will never happen. 63
A few focus group participants discussed the possibility of
change within law firms. One partner participating in a New York
focus group attributed recent changes to "bottom-up" pressure
from associates who communicate with their feet and leave firms.
Change may occur if firms recognize what one Chicago partner de-
59. For more detailed discussion of the survey results related to morale, satisfac-
tion, and attrition, see id. at 95-96.
60. In the 1999-2000 Associate Survey, thirty-nine percent of respondents reported
that they were interested in changing employers in the next two years. When asked to
indicate the factor most influential in causing respondents to change jobs, the largest
percentage (twenty-eight percent) checked "reduction in hours." The largest percent-
age of associates who wanted to change jobs (thirty-seven percent) indicated that they
were most interested in a "corporate counsel position." 1999-2000 Associate Survey,
supra note 9, at 283-87.
61. As stated by one commentator:
Hourly billing causes the lawyer's life to be consumed by the need to log an
increasing number of billable hours. Law firms tend to become "hours fac-
tories" and the quality of the representation may decline as well as lawyer
collegiality. Even though lawyers have recognized the harm caused to their
profession and their client relationships, implementing change has been
difficult.
Arthur G. Green, Thinking Outside the Box, Bus. L. TODAY, May-June 2004, at 17.
62. UNPUBLISHED WORK-LIFE SURVEY DATA, supra note 29.
63. Id.
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scribed as a "powerful business rationale" for adopting policies
that reduce "attrition of talented lawyers and the consequent re-
duction in the need to spend money to recruit and train
lawyers .... I
To determine what policies and systems will address associate
attrition, firm managers can use feedback and recommendations
provided by Associate Retention or Quality of Life Committees.
In the 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, 41.6 percent
of supervised firm attorneys reported that they would "definitely
use" a quality of life and/or retention committee.65 Such commit-
tees can serve as channel for associates to communicate their con-
cerns and interests.
In 2002, a demonstration of "bottom-up" pressure occurred at
Clifford Chance, the world's largest law firm. 6 6 Following the pub-
lication of the results of The American Lawyer's 2002 associate sur-
vey, in which Clifford Chance rated last, the firm sought feedback
from U.S. associates on its personnel committee.67 This group of
six associates prepared a thirteen-page memorandum to Clifford
Chance's partners in its New York office ("Associate Memoran-
dum").68 In referring to the "abysmal," last place ranking in The
American Lawyer's October 2002 'Associates Survey,' ('the
AmLaw Survey'), the Associate Memorandum stated, "our re-
search has convinced us that the AmLaw Survey captures neither
the breadth nor the depth of associate anger and frustration. 69
Thereafter, the Associate Memorandum discussed problems that
contribute to associate discontent. After the Associate Memoran-
dum was leaked to the press, the portion of the memorandum that
triggered the most attention was the 2,420 billable hours require-
ment, the first "major problem" listed in the Associate Memoran-
64. 2005 NALP FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, at 53.
65. In the same study, only 12.3 percent of supervised firm attorneys indicated
that their firm currently had quality of life and/or retention committees. 2005 NALP
FOUNDATION WORK-LIFE STUDY, supra note 10, app. B at 87.
66. Bob Sherwood, Clifford Chance Calls "War Council," FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28,
2002, at 1.
67. Robert Lennon, The Memo Heard Round the World, AM. LAW., Dec. 2002, at
19 (discussing the "veritable uproar" and exaggerated media stories that followed
news of the associates' memorandum).
68. See id. (describing the genesis of the Associate Memorandum).
69. The full text of the Associate Memorandum was first reprinted in an article
written by Bob Sherwood. See Sherwood, supra note 66, at 1. The memorandum
itself explains that it incorporates comments made by associates at a Town Hall meet-
ing (attended by approximately 140 associates), associates' responses to a personnel
committee survey, and discussions among personnel committee members and various
firm associates.
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dum.7 ° After explaining that the "requirement constituted the
greatest area of discontent by far," the Associate Memorandum
elaborated on specific consequences of the firm imposing such a
requirement. 71 In referring to feedback obtained from firm associ-
ates, the Associate Memorandum stated:
Associates stated that the requirement is profoundly unrealistic,
particularly in slow areas of the firm. Moreover, Associates
found the stress on billable hours dehumanizing and verging on
an abdication of our professional responsibilities insofar as the
requirement ignores pro bono work and encourages "padding"
of hours, inefficient work, repetition of tasks, and other
problems. Associates expressed concerns that the requirement
promotes misallocation of work to senior associates who "need"
the hours when less expensive junior associates could do the
work. Associates also stated that partners care only about asso-
ciates' billable hours.72
According to an article in The Financial Times that released the
full text of the Associate Memorandum, the claims that attorneys
were encouraged to "pad" billable hours sparked client inquiries.73
To address possible client concerns related to overcharging and in-
flated legal bills, the firm reportedly convened a "council of war"
to "co-ordinate strategy and decide on a united message to give to
clients. '74 The Financial Times article indicated that the firm "said
it would review the billing hours requirement. 75
Following the unfavorable press related to the billing require-
ment and other associate complaints, Clifford Chance took steps to
address associate concerns.76 Press reports suggested that these
changes contributed to Clifford Chance scoring the biggest per-
centage increase among firms rated in The American Lawyer's
70. A copy of the full text is available at http://www.lawcost.com/clifchancememo.
htm. According to the Associate Memorandum, the requirements consisted of 2,200
hours of "hard billable" work and 220 hours of "soft billable" time. After the memo-
randum was leaked, a firm representative confirmed that the firm set a 2,200 hour
"target," while encouraging associates to spend time outside client billables. Lennon,
supra note 67, at 19.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Sherwood, supra note 66, at 1.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Amy Vincent, On the Move, AM. LAW., Oct. 2003, at 103 (reviewing results
and significant changes of firms rated in the 2003 Am Law annual mid-level associate
survey).
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2003 Associate Survey.77 The American Lawyer indicated that one
Clifford Chance associate believed that "the firm has finally con-
vinced associates that it takes their concerns seriously," and an-
other respondent hailed "the revocation of the 2,420-hour billables
requirement."78
Reflecting on the Clifford Chance saga illustrates an interesting
interplay of different forces and dynamics involved in large firm
practice. First, the story started with The American Lawyer survey.
Such surveys provide a vehicle for disgruntled associates to grade,
laud, lampoon, and criticize their firms. Firms, particularly those
seeking to be included in The American Lawyer listing of the "top
20 firms" in the legal profession, may take steps to improve their
ratings.79 Second, media reports may affect firm reputation, influ-
ence client perceptions, and trigger changes in firm policies and
practices. In retrospect, "bottom-up" pressure from Clifford
Chance associates, coupled with partner desire to improve survey
ratings and the need to avoid client defections, may have led to the
firm's decision to revoke the 2,420-hour billing target.
The efficacy of "bottom up" pressure largely depends on firm
size, position, composition, economics, and culture. In some firms,
partners who view associates as fungible may discount the need to
respond to associate complaints and concerns about billable-hours
requirements and firm practices.
Even recalcitrant partners who resist changes sought by associ-
ates may take a different stance when forced to deal with market
pressure. Specifically, partners may be persuaded to make changes
if failure to do so adversely affects their ability to retain and attract
clients. This could occur if consumers considered the prospective
firms' attrition rates and billable hours expectations.
General counsel for corporations, as buyers of legal services, are
the best prepared client representatives to evaluate the firms that
court their business.8" Over the last two decades, general counsel
for corporations have used different approaches in selecting
77. Id. (reporting that Clifford Chance's score rose from 2.74 in 2002 to 3.398 in
2003, a twenty-four percent increase in the firm's overall rating).
78. Id.
79. In 2003, The American Lawyer introduced a list of the "best law firms in the
land." Aric Press, The A-List, AM. LAW., Sept. 2004, at 84. This list is based on a
"carefully weighted ranking" derived from surveys of the AmLaw 200, the highest-
grossing U.S. headquartered firms. The ranking is based on the following standards:
revenue per lawyer, pro bono work, associate satisfaction, and diversity. Id. at 84-85.
80. See Brad Blickstein, "Mr. Inside... Mr. Outside"; Getting the Right Message to
General Counsel, N.J. LAW.: THE WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Dec. 6, 2004, at 2487 (referring
to the "increasing sophistication of general counsel as buyers of legal services").
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outside counsel. Faced with intense pressure to reduce amounts
expended for outside counsel, many of these approaches involved
cost-cutting measures, such as using independent legal auditors,
task-based billing, and research outsourcing.8' While the results of
these efforts may be mixed, general counsel continue to proactively
seek ideas to minimize the costs of outside counsel while maintain-
ing and enhancing the quality of legal representation.82 Surveys of
general counsel reveal that their most pressing concern is control-
ling the costs of outside counsel.83
Corporate counsel are increasingly asking law firms to lower
their bills 84 and to use alternative fee arrangements.8 5 In experi-
menting with alternative fee arrangements, some general counsel
recognize that the nature of billable hours practice may drive up
the costs of legal services because the billable hours fee structure
rewards inefficiency.86 As explained by a law firm consultant,
"Rates don't drive costs, [inefficient] staffing does. ' 87
Beyond the inefficiency associated with billing hours to maxi-
mize income, increasing billable-hours requirements within firms
also impacts the costs of legal services. As discussed in Part II,
billable-hours pressure is driving many attorneys out of private
practice. In addition to tangible attrition costs, attrition also can
adversely impact the firm clients who are served by departed attor-
neys. Unless the outside law firm absorbs costs of "bringing the
new attorney up to speed," attrition can increase the cost of attor-
81. For a review of the relative success of popular approaches used by general
counsel in the 1990s, see Krysten Crawford, When Good Ideas Go Bad; In the 1990s,
A Host of Trendy New Ideas Were Supposed to Change the Practice of Law as We
Knew It, But Did They Actually Work? LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at 21.
82. Irving B. Levinson, 101 Ways to Control Outside Legal Costs; Part I, Do You
Really Need to Hire Outside Counsel? Read This First, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug.
1995, at 11.
83. See Cutting Costs, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at 6 (reporting that for the third
year in a row a American Corporate Counsel survey of in-house counsel indicated
that their "most pressing concern is trying to reduce outside legal spending").
84. Tom McCann, Corporate Counsel Urge Law Firms to Use Business Sense, CHI.
LAW., May 2003, at 36.
85. Thomas L. Sager, All Corporate Lawyers Should Embrace Alternative Billing,
CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1997, at 13 (discussing DuPont's use of alternative fee
arrangements).
86. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Carr & Mark D. Wolf, IN-HousE SUPPLEMENT, Service
Means More than Just Billable Hours, TEX. LAW, Feb. 3, 2003, at 13 (two in-house
counsel promoting a new fee-structuring model in which outside counsel share risks
and rewards).
87. Crawford, supra note 81, at 21 (quoting Peter Zeughauser, a Newport Beach,
California consultant).
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neys who bill on an hourly basis. 88 Attrition may also adversely
affect institutional knowledge and personal relationships. 89 Under-
standing the costs of turnover, some general counsel are "consider-
ing attrition" and quality-of-life issues that affect attrition "in
deciding which firms to retain." 90 General counsel factoring attri-
tion into their selection of firms may spur firms to take additional
steps to reduce attrition. As suggested above, setting a reasonable
billing target or requirement should improve the retention of many
attorneys who indicate that they are changing jobs for a reduction
in hours.91
Given the connection between attrition and billable hours pres-
sure, general counsel should seek information on firms' billable
hours requirements and factor that information into their decision
to hire particular firms. General counsel who focus on the risks
and costs associated with high billable hours requirements will real-
ize that such information does not merely relate to firms' internal
operations, but rather to the cost and quality of legal services. 92
Those general counsel who consider billable hours requirements
when hiring outside firms recognize that high billable hours re-
quirements create incentives to "overwork" files. They also appre-
ciate that attorneys' ability to think critically and creatively may be
adversely affected by consistently working long hours.
In retaining outside counsel, general counsel already weigh a va-
riety of factors.93 As demonstrated by the leadership role that gen-
88. See Peter D. Zeughauser, The Beauty Contest: Responding to the RFP,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 14, 1991, at 45 (recommending that law firms address corporate con-
cerns about turnover by undertaking to "absorb the cost of bringing new lawyer up to
speed").
89. Joan Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Letting Lawyers Cut Back Can Save
Money and Retain Talent-If Firms Do It Right, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at 60.
90. See Lorelie S. Masters, What Women (Lawyers) Want-And Need, More Than
200 Attorneys Gather in D.C. for NAWL Conference on Career Development, Law
Firm Initiatives, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at 18. (citing reports from Professor
Joan Williams, Co-Chair of the Attorney Retention Project at American University's
Washington College of Law, and in-house attorneys Carole Jordan of Fannie Mae and
Patricia Merrill of GE Asset Management).
91. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
92. See Tamara Loomis, Partner Status is a Billing Issue, NAT'L L.J., 2005, at 8.
Beyond scrutinizing bills after legal work is already performed, some general counsel
have sought information on firm structures and systems. For example, with the recent
increase in the number of non-equity partners in firms, the legal department at E.I. du
Pont De Nemours & Co. has asked firms to reveal the status of their partners when
the firms ask for fee increases. Id.
93. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP, Top of Mind, Second Annual Survey of In-
House Counsel, http://www.klng.com/TOM brochure_2004/media/topofmindj1l.pdf
(last visited July 24, 2005). According to a study of senior in-house counsel at FOR-
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eral counsel have played in considering the diversity of the firms
they retain, general counsel can positively influence firms who
compete in "beauty contests" for corporate legal work.94 By seek-
ing information on firms' attrition rates and billable hours require-
ments, general counsel may trigger firms to rethink the current
course of affairs.
CONCLUSION
The voices of study participants put a personal face on the costs
and consequences of billable hour pressure. Firm leaders who un-
derstand the personal and professional toll of increasing billable
hour requirements should fashion alternative work and compensa-
tion structures. Even firm principals reticent to change may re-
spond to "bottom-up" and market pressure once they recognize
the business case for allowing alternative approaches, such as re-
duced-hours arrangements for attorneys.95
Discriminating general counsel who seek information on firms'
attrition rates and billable hour requirements can play an impor-
tant role in causing firms to withdraw from the billable hour derby.
As suggested by two in-house attorneys who urged firms to be
"customer-focused," "in-house counsel will continue to insist on
paying for value and efficiency and such insistence will ultimately
lead to a changed law firm economic model." 96
TUNE 500 and 1000 businesses, eighty-nine percent ranked "effective communica-
tion" as a top factor when choosing outside counsel. Id.
94. See Rick Palmore, A Call to Action-Diversity in the Legal Profession, Associa-
tion of Corporate Counsel (Oct. 2004), at http://www.acca.com/public/accapolicy/di-
versity.pdf. A Call to Action, authored by Rick Palmore, the Chief Legal Office of
Sara Lee, and signed by numerous general counsel across the country, stated that
firms could "positively distinguish themselves through their diversity efforts." The
signatories also stated that we "intend to end or limit our relationship with firms
whose performance consistently evidence a lack of meaningful interest in being di-
verse." Id.; see also Leigh Jones, GCS Call For Greater Diversity Among Top-Tier
Firms, THE RECORDER, Mar. 31, 2005, at 3 (explaining that A Call to Action, signed
by hundreds of general counsel, is a revised version of a 1999 proclamation calling for
more diversity in law firms). For a description of general counsel efforts to promote
and track firm diversity, see Nathan Koppel, The 27 Winners of the Oil Giant's Beauty
Contest Have One Thing in Common: The Firms Can Show-Through Hiring and
Billable Hours-How Serious They are about Diversity, CORP. COUNS., Aug. 2004, at
106.
95. 2005 NALP Foundation Work-Life Study, supra note 10, at 50-51. For an ex-
cellent commentary on the business justification for allowing attorneys to work less
and make less, see JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, SOLVING THE
PART-TIME PUZZLE: THE LAW FIRM'S GUIDE To BALANCED HOURS 11-23 (2004).
96. Carr & Wolf, supra note 86, at 13.
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Rather than waiting for general counsel to inquire about attri-
tion rates and billable hours requirements, law firms leaders could
impress general counsel and other consumers of legal services by
taking steps to address various deleterious effects of billable hours
practice. For example, firms could lower onerous billable hours re-
quirements and discontinue linking bonuses to billable hours pro-
duction.97 By adopting the Law Firm Billing Policy and "best
practices" described in the ABA Billable Hours Commission Re-
port, law firms can distinguish themselves when seeking business
from new clients and fortifying relationships with existing clients. 98
In the long run, the desire to attract and retain clients may bring
billable hour requirements back to a reasonable level, promising to
improve the quality of work for clients and quality of life for firm
lawyers.
97. According to the A.B.A. Billable Hours Commission Report, a compensation
"system that ties compensation-whether salary or bonus-directly to billable hours
with no flexibility and no reflection . . . is a 'worst practice."' A.B.A. BILLABLE
HOURS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
98. Id. at 46-51. To discourage associates from "simply compiling more hours for
more money," the A.B.A. Billable Hours Commission recommends that firms "place
a ceiling on the number of hours, over which no additional compensation in salary or
bonus will be paid regardless of how high the hours." Id. at 47.
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